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Abstract 
 
Android forensics has evolved over time offering significant opportunities and exciting 
challenges. On one hand, being an open source platform Android is giving developers the 
freedom to contribute to the rapid growth of the Android market whereas on the other hand 
Android users may not be aware of the security and privacy implications of installing these 
applications on their phones. Users may assume that a password-locked device protects their 
personal information, but applications may retain private information on devices, in ways that 
users might not anticipate. In this thesis we will be concentrating on one such application called 
'WhatsApp', a popular social networking application. We will be forming an outline on how 
forensic investigators can extract useful information from WhatsApp and from similar 
applications installed on an Android platform. Our area of focus is extraction and analysis of 
application user data from non-volatile external storage and the volatile memory (RAM) of an 
Android device. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Android, WhatsApp, Volatile Memory, Mobile Forensics, Information Assurance, Application 
Security, Data Security, Computer Science 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to Wikipedia[1] “WhatsApp Messenger is a proprietary, cross-platform instant 
messaging application for smart-phones. In addition to text messaging, users can send each other 
images, video, and audio media messages. The client software is available for Android, 
Blackberry OS, Blackberry 10, iOS, Series 40, Symbian (S60), and Windows Phone. WhatsApp 
Inc. was founded in 2009 by Brian Acton and Jan Koum, both veterans of Yahoo!, and is based in 
Santa Clara, California. Competing with a number of Asian-based messaging services (like 
LINE, KakaoTalk, and WeChat), WhatsApp was handling ten billion messages per day as of 
August 2012, growing from two billion in April 2012” 
“According to the Financial Times, WhatsApp has done to SMS on mobile phones what Skype 
did to international calling on landlines.” 
 
WhatsApp has gained lights' speed in terms of a social networking application. The number of 
downloads for WhatsApp on Android, exceeds one hundred million. In only three years it is 
among the top 30 free applications and among the top five free communication applications on 
Google Play. 
 
WhatsApp uses your 3G or Wi-Fi (when available) to message with friends and family. It is a 
lightweight around 10M sized application with an option to send and receive unlimited messages 
for free. In all its features, WhatsApp can be used as a complete solution to easy and cost 
effective networking on a phone. In order to use the services of 'WhatsApp', a user must provide 
a phone number using which internally a user account is created with user-id such as ([phone 
number]@s.whatsapp.net). 
 
WhatsApp is a cross-platform mobile messaging service which can auto sync to the address 
book, automatically showing all the contacts using WhatsApp. There is no restriction on the 
length and number of messages one can exchange and no carrier IM fees apply. One does not 
need to install a sim-card to use WhatsApp; the only requirements are a supported phone, 
internet connection and storage space on the phone to download the application. 
 
  
2 
 
WhatsApp uses a customized version of the open standard Extensible Messaging and Presence 
Protocol (XMPP) to exchange data over the internet. Messages can be in the form of plain text, 
multimedia message like photos, audio, video, location, address book contact cards and icons. 
 
The plethora of personal information that can be exchanged gives us a reason to look at 
WhatsApp through a forensic glass. 
 
 
2. Why WhatsApp forensics? 
 
WhatsApp is a cross platform application with versions available for Android, BlackBerry, 
iPhone and Symbian operating systems. It is a widely used and universal application. 
 
WhatsApp as an application is not phone dependent, like certain applications that are only 
supported by certain phones e.g. Motoblur intended for specific Motorola phones. WhatsApp is 
not carrier dependent, like certain applications supported only by certain service providers, e.g. 
The 'Verizon Cloud' application that is intended only for users with Verizon Wireless phone 
service. WhatsApp is not operating system dependent, like certain apps that can be installed only 
on certain platforms, e.g. Symbian or iOS specific applications. WhatsApp is not factory 
installed (inbuilt into the phone) and hopefully in the future may not be device dependent (as of 
now it can only be installed on smart-phones and not on tablets/pc's). On most smart-phones the 
WhatsApp application charges an initial installation amount but it is free for the android 
platform. This gives us one more reason to test the security of the application on the android 
platform in particular. 
 
The main purpose of this research is to identify various data security issues in instant messaging 
applications on the Android platform which aid in forensic investigations. Information is stored 
in different formats at varied locations on the phone. Our aim is to summarize a general 
methodology to gather valuable information, so a standard investigation process can be followed 
for all similar applications. The goal and aim of this research was achieved successfully. 
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3. Related Work 
 
The open source nature of the Android platform has tempted developers, hackers, and forensic 
analysts to dig into the fundamentals of the system. Before we discuss our research let us see 
some of the work done in this area. 
 
3.1 WhatsApp Database - Hardware Acquisition 
"Forensic Analysis of Instant Messenger Applications on Android Devices." Mahajan, Aditya, M. 
S. Dahiya, and H. P. Sanghvi. (2013) [3] 
 
A UFED physical analyzer was used to analyze instant messenger applications (WhatsApp and 
Viber) on Android devices. In the case of WhatsApp, chat message artifacts, timestamps and 
names of files sent and received were found however the storage locations of those files were not 
found. In manual examination of “WhatsApp” application after the File System Extraction, 
database files (msgstore.db and wa.db) were found with details of chat sessions.   
 
Mainly the database extraction and a good detailed analysis was done for existing messages. 
Analysis of RAM for the WhatsApp application data remnants was not considered and retrieval 
of deleted data was mentioned as a future project. We considered extracting deleted messages 
from RAM and have been able to do so. 
Also, database extraction was done using the UFED physical analyzer, whereas an un-encrypted 
version can be obtained if we root the phone. 
 
3.2 WhatsApp Database - Software Acquisition and Analysis 
Whatsapp Xtract 2.0 -Zena Forensics [4] 
 
Another contribution to WhatsApp forensics was made by Francesco Picasso who wrote a tool to 
decrypt and organize SQLite database files in an organized HTML form. The tool works for both 
encrypted and decrypted database files. 
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The WhatsApp Database Encryption Project [5], has made known a vulnerability in the Android 
implementation of the AES cypher: the 192-bit key can be detected performing both static or 
active analysis on the software package.  And the result is: 
 346a23652a46392b4d73257c67317e352e3372482177652c 
 
A python script uses this key to decrypt and encrypted db file and presents the result in an HTML 
page. The paper implies that the same encryption key is used for all WhatsApp installations on 
Android. We used the Python tool to decrypt and interpret our encrypted database and it was 
done successfully. A snapshot of our output is presented in Figure.1 
 
We can alternately read the database files through the 'SQLite browser' but the timestamps  and 
representation of data is not straightforward. Another advantage of the tool is that the media 
content exchanged is displayed on the HTML page itself , one does not have to look into the 
media folder separately. The tool can be useful in comparing the data we analyze. 
 
All the features of the tool sums it up into a useful one but once the messages are deleted from 
the database, the tool will not be able to retrieve and represent them. The tool can  represent only 
static information that is present in the database. The databases on the external storage(usually 
SD card) is updated only periodically, leading to old data representation. 
 
We wanted to find a way to retrieve deleted messages so we decided on Volatile memory 
acquisition and Analysis. Also, in order to acquire updated user information we must do live 
analysis on the device and acquire volatile memory for further analysis. 
 
Section 4. gives details of Android Memory Management and Data Storage for Android 
Applications. On getting a general outlook of how applications process and store data on 
Android we carved a path for our research in terms of data acquisition strategies and analysis. 
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Figure 1. WhatsApp Xtract Tool output 
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4. Android Applications  
 
Android applications are written in the Java programming language. The Android SDK tools 
compile the code into a .apk archive file. All the code in a single .apk file is considered to be one 
application and is the file that Android-powered devices use to install the application. 
 Once installed on a device, each Android application lives in its own security sandbox. The 
Android operating system is a multi-user Linux system in which each application is a different 
user. By default, every application runs in its own Linux process. Android starts the process 
when any of the application's components need to be executed, then shuts down the process 
when it's no longer needed or when the system must recover memory for other applications. 
[6][7][8] 
 
4.1 Memory Management 
The two primary types to memory present in Android devices are volatile (RAM) and non-
volatile (NAND flash) memory. RAM is used to load and run the important parts of the OS, 
applications and data. RAM being volatile does not maintain its state once the phone is powered 
down. However, NAND flash memory is non-volatile and data is preserved even if the device is 
powered down. 
Android has a unique mechanism to manage application memory. Android uses its own runtime 
environment and Dalvik virtual machine to create an efficient and secure application 
environment. 
Android ensures application responsiveness by stopping and killing processes as necessary to 
free resources for higher-priority applications. In other words, all Android applications will 
remain running and in memory until the system needs its resources for other applications. This 
security feature has proven to be beneficial for our research. 
 
4.2 Data Storage 
A key part of the Android security model is that at installation, each application is assigned a 
unique Linux user and group ID and runs in its own process and Dalvik VM. 
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During installation, the operating system creates a specific directory for the application and 
allows only that application to access all the data stored in that directory. These mechanisms 
ensure data security at the low level as applications do not share memory, permissions or disk 
storage. 
However, forensic analysts are primarily concerned with data pertaining to human interaction 
which can be extracted and analyzed by scrutinizing different data storage mediums through a 
forensic glass. 
Android applications store data mainly in two locations, external storage and internal storage. On 
the external storage (SD card), the data can be stored and managed at any location whereas on 
the internal storage data storage is controlled by the Android APIs. 
Persistent data is stored either to the NAND flash, the SD card or the network. A standard data 
storage structure for Applications is shown in Figure 2. 
When an application is installed the data pertaining to the application is stored in  
/data/data/<package_name> 
e.g. /data/data/com.whatsapp 
Inside this subdirectory there are a number of standard subdirectories found in many 
applications. Application developers usually control data that is stored in this directory. The most 
common subdirectories are lib, files, cache and databases. 
Among the five methods of storing data on a device mentioned in Figure 2. Android Application 
Data Storage Options, analysts can uncover data from four of the five possible formats. Beyond 
the above formats, the Linux kernel and Android stack provide good information through logs, 
debugging, reverse engineering and other tools. 
 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Section 5 presents the Methodology of our 
approach. Section 6 describes Forensic Analysis of WhatsApp - Our Approach. Experimental 
Setup and Testing is covered in Sections 7 and Section 8 and finally Section9 and Section 10 
shows our Research Findings and Conclusion. 
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Figure 2. Android Application Data Storage Options 
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5. Methodology 
 
The primary goal of this research was to test the WhatsApp application from the forensic point of 
view on an Android phone. The basic approach to Android memory acquisition was kept in mind 
during our research and steps were taken to minimize any human footprints on the acquired data.   
 
WhatsApp 2.9 [1] was first installed on more than one Android phone using the Google Play 
store. The application gets stored in the Internal Memory of the phone. Automatically the app 
syncs with the phone's contacts showing people already using WhatsApp. 
 
When a phone with WhatsApp installed is turned on, the “com.whatsapp” process receives a 
signal to start the 'ExternalMediaManage' and 'MessageService' services which run in the 
background as long as the phone is on. Any messages exchanged are stored in the 'msgstore.db' 
and 'wa.db' which are SQLite databases. The databases are loaded into RAM for faster access of 
data. Typically all the content may not persist or may be overwritten due to swapping in RAM 
but this may not be true for Android. 
 
Based on the Android process lifecycle, an application executes for as long as possible.[7] 
Android performs garbage collection on application-by- application basis and is based on the 
priority of a process. Unless a higher priority process needs more memory resources and RAM is 
full, the data may persist in memory for an extended period of time. This feature proves to be 
useful for us to extract WhatsApp contents from memory. 
 
The WhatsApp application is an instant messenger service so users get notified about messages 
through the push-mechanism, as soon as any messages are received thus WhatsApp maintains a 
high priority in memory, mainly a visible process. This gives the user the convenience of 
continuously receiving messages in the background without having to download them from a 
typical web server like an email service. 
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6. Forensic Analysis of WhatsApp - Our Approach 
 
Our approach is performing live analysis on an Android smartphone to extract user interaction 
information from the WhatsApp application. 
 
We mainly concentrate on two areas of evidence collection: 
1.WhatsApp Data acquisition and analysis from non-volatile memory 
2.WhatsApp Data acquisition and analysis from Volatile Memory 
 
6.1 Data Acquisition and Analysis - Non-Volatile Memory 
 
WhatsApp stores its user data in a SQLite database (msgstore.db and wa.db). The location and 
structure of the database varies from platform to platform. Here we are concentrating on devices 
with the Android platform. 
 
If one chooses not to root the device one can gain access to the backed up WhatsApp folder on 
the SD card. This folder mainly contains three sub-folders such as: 
 
/sdcard/WhatsApp/Databases 
/sdcard/WhatsApp/Media 
/sdcard/WhatsApp/ProfilePictures 
 
The database is present in the form of an encrypted file on the SD card at: 
 
/sdcard/WhatsApp/Databases/msgstore.db.crypt 
 
The WhatsApp Database Encryption Project [5], implies that the same AES with a 192-bit 
encryption key (346a23652a46392b4d73257c67317e352e3372482177652c) is being used for all 
WhatsApp installations on the Android platform. 
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WhatsApp Xtract [4]   has introduced a basic Python script that takes an encrypted db 
file(msgstore.db.crypt) as input and gives a decrypted db file(msgstore.plain.db) as output. 
 
The output file can be read using the sqlitebrowser software. We used an open source tool - 
WhatsAppXtract [4], in order to be able to read the information in a more human readable form 
and compare our results in the sqlitebrowser. With this tool one can open the media files and see 
the messages directly from the output HTML file shown in Figure 1. 
 
The tool does not describe the complete WhatsApp database structure that one can see in the 
sqlitebrowser software. Please refer to Figure 3. for the msgstore.db structure. [4] In addition to 
the structure the SQL statements and data types can also be seen in the sqlitebrowser software. 
 
Other than the encrypted database file one can also gain access to other sub-folders in the 
WhatsApp folder on the SD card like : 
 
/sdcard/WhatsApp/Media 
/sdcard/WhatsApp/ProfilePictures 
 
The data in these folders is not encrypted. The Media folder contains all the media files such as 
Audios, Videos and Images exchanged during a chat session with the current user. 
 
Backup of the files from the device to the SD card is made every day around 4:00 a.m. Absence 
of the most recent data from the decrypted database or the media folder only means that the 
application has not backed up the latest data into the database on the SD card for today yet. 
 
On the other hand if one roots the device we see that the plain database files wa.db and 
msgstore.db , which can be found directly on the SD card at : 
 
/data/data/com.whatsapp/databases/ msgstore.db and wa.db 
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Figure 3. WhatsApp Database Structure 
 
 
 
 
On looking into the files using 'sqlitebrowser' software, we noticed the structure of the database. 
Please refer to Figure 4. SQLite Browser – msgstore.db -messages table. 
 
The wa.db file contains the wa_contacts table which mainly consists of the contact list of users. 
The msgstore.db file mainly consists of the chat_list table and messages table. The chat_list table 
contains the list of users that have been contacted using WhatsApp and the number of messages 
exchanged with them and the messages table contains the messages in plain text including the 
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timestamps ,size of message, type of media file exchanged, size of media_file and status of 
message.   
 
We found that on rooting the device one gains access to all files in the following directory. 
Useful forensic evidence can be extracted and analyzed from this folder on the external storage:     
/data/data/com.whatsapp/ 
e.g. /data/data/com.whatsapp/files 
 
This directory contains information about the current user's WhatsApp account. It contains sub-
directories such as , Logs- giving device memory and network connection information and 
Avatars - containing profile pictures of all users with whom the current device has interacted 
with. 
 
These files can be backed on a local machine in order avoid any footprints on the original data. 
Our research shows that on gaining access to a device through USB debugging enabled, personal 
information of a user can be compromised. 
 
On gaining root access to a device almost all of the application data stored on the internal storage 
becomes public. One can obtain forensic evidence from the phone whether the device under 
investigation is rooted or not. 
 
 
6.2 Data Acquisition and Analysis - Volatile Memory(RAM) 
 
We saw that most of the Android Forensic research for the WhatsApp application was 
concentrated on contents of the internal flash NAND memory or external SD card. No research 
has been done related to volatile memory acquisition and analysis for WhatsApp. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4. SQLite Browser 
 
 
 
The volatile memory contains important information for any investigator as it has the most recent 
information accessed through the phone. A phone has become the lifeline of most humans and an 
IM application (like WhatsApp) on it speaks a lot about what a person has been doing lately. We 
need to get hold of all that information to do live analysis on the device, before it i
that information is lost. Now we will see how that information can be collected and analyzed in 
time. 
 
We started with volatile memory extraction using LiME
(LKM), that allows the acquisition of volatile memory from Linux and Linux
 
14 
output – msgstore.db -messages table
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such as those powered by Android. LiME is a complete tool for getting all the contents from the 
memory. When we used the tool to extract memory, we realized it gives a huge binary dump file 
of around the size of 512mb-1 GB containing all physical RAM contents. The binary dump 
obtained from LiME can be analyzed using 'The Volatility Framework'[10] ,which is an open 
source collection of tools to extract useful information from RAM dumps pertaining to 
processes.    
 
For further research we opted to use a different approach for extraction of memory since we 
knew the target process (here WhatsApp) we are looking to investigate and did not need data 
related to all other processes in memory. Looking through a huge file with all RAM contents, 
could yield numerous false positives. Moreover, installation and extraction of data using 
Volatility could become cumbersome for only one specific process, here WhatsApp. 
 
We decided to take a simpler approach for extraction of volatile memory as we did not need data 
related to all other processes, so we used 'Memfetch' [12] 
 
6.2.1 Memfetch - Data Acquisition 
 
Memfetch is a simple yet powerful open source utility that can dump all the memory of a 
running process, either immediately or when a fault condition is discovered and does not disrupt 
the operation of the running process. In order to run 'memfetch' on an Android device, some 
changes need to be made to it. [11][12] 
 
Memfetch is lightweight and can be easily pushed to the phone's SD card using the Android 
Debug Bridge (adb).The following steps can aid in getting a forensic sound memory capture: 
 
$adb push memfetch /sdcard/memfetch 
 
Once the file is copied to the SD card we check for the process id of WhatsApp using 'ps'. The 
'ps' command ps displays information about a selection of the active processes. For this we 
obtain a shell on the phone and get super user access to it.  
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We can gain super user access by rooting the phone. Further details about rooting are mentioned 
in Section 8.Testing and Results 
 
$adb shell 
$su 
#ps 
 
On obtaining the process-id (pid) of the com.whatsapp process, we can extract its process 
memory using memfetch for android. 
 
When we tried to execute memfetch directly on the SD card we realized that the SD card was 
mounted with 'noexec' option so we moved memfetch to another executable mount point. To 
create the mount point inside SD card we did the following: 
 
#cd /sdcard 
#mkdir -p tmp 
#mount -t tmpfs tmpfs tmp 
#cp memfetch tmp/ 
#cd tmp 
#./memfetch pid of com.whatsapp 
 
The above turns to be useful in two ways, one we have an executable mount point tmpfs and 
second all the result files that memfetch will output will be in one folder(here tmp). 
Memory is dumped in a set of files - mfetch.lst describes all files, including their mapping 
addresses and source, map*.bin files are a copy of all non-anonymous maps (shared libraries, 
mostly) and mem*.bin files are anonymous memory blocks, most likely code, stack and heap 
segments. 
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From these output files we are interested in the heap of the application (WhatsApp) so we note 
the start and end address of the heap from mfetch.lst file and search a matching mem/map file. 
Usually it is the second memory region (mem-002.bin). 
 
Our next target is to copy the heap dump (mem-002.bin) to the local machine to avoid any 
forensic footprints on the phone's SD card. So we copy it to the SD card from our local mount 
point and then pull it using adb on the phone. 
 
$adb pull /sdcard/mem-002.bin 
 
The heap (mem-002.bin) a binary file, gives us a complete memory capture for the WhatsApp 
process which we need to further analysis. Memfetch is a safe method to acquire volatile 
memory of a process. Based on the way Android handles process memory described in section 
4.1 we can assume that all our application data is present in the RAM when we acquire it. 
Further analysis of the heap has proved our assumption to be true. 
 
6.2.2 WhatsApp Data Analysis and Presentation 
 
Once we had the heap dump on our machine we analyzed the file with different tools and 
methods. Our aim was to find WhatsApp messages and user data. 
 
We looked into the .binary file by creating a hex dump using 'xxd' and analyzing it manually. We 
also executed 'strings' to search for phone numbers, messages or user specific data. This process 
can be time consuming when one is unsure what data to look for but works well for targeted 
messages or phone numbers. 
 
To make it simpler to display basic evidence we have made a tool namely 'whatsappRamXtract'. 
It is mainly used to extract information from the heap dump (mem-002.bin) and show it to the 
user in a readable format instead of having to search a huge file manually. 
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Our tool 'whatsappRamXtract' is a bash script which carves the useful evidence from a binary 
file.  As of now we have covered three primary areas of focus in our tool but it is fully open 
source and customizable as per need. Options available are to output numbers (-num option), 
messages (-mess option) and SQL statements (-sql option). 
 
Our tool takes the .binary file as input with the option of displaying numbers used in the current 
device through WhatsApp, Messages exchanged and SQL statements giving database evidence. 
We will see more details of its usage in section 8. 
 
In addition to the text messages we retrieved, images were also carved out from the .binary file 
using Scalpel. [15] This tool is a powerful one that can carve various file formats from a huge 
binary file. It gives us the ease of configuring the file type we want to carve from our binary in 
turn displaying the completed result files in a folder. The good part is, RAM may contain deleted 
media which Scalpel can carve out efficiently, without us having to interpret a binary file. 
 
Our take on Deleted Messages: 
 
We want to make a special mention about this area because the user may think that a message 
that they deleted is out-of-sight so out-of-mind. In case of WhatsApp, if a message is deleted 
from the application it is removed from the database but not immediately from RAM (volatile 
memory). 
 
Let’s consider a scenario of a crime where the criminal is aware of the consequences, if his/her 
WhatsApp messages were to be read during an investigation. In an attempt to be proved innocent 
the criminal deletes all the chats from the application that can give any evidence. With the help 
of our work an investigator can perform live analysis on the device and retrieve any deleted 
message. The information is deleted from the database to maintain the integrity of the application 
but the way Android manages its memory, the information still lurks in the volatile memory. 
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7. Experimental Setup 
 
In terms of hardware used for our research we used two Motorola Droid2 phones, a USB cable 
and a computer for analysis of data retrieved. 
In terms of software and versions used please refer Figure 5. Software Used for more details. 
 
Figure 5. Software Used 
 
Software Version 
Android 2.2 
WhatsApp 2.9 
MemFetch (customized for Android) 0.05b 
Universal Androot 1.6.2 
Ubuntu 11.10 
Oracle VM VirtualBox 4.2.12 
Extension Pack 4.2.12 
Guest additions 4.2.12 
Android adt-bundle-linux x86_64 
SQliteBrowser 2.0 
WhatsApp Xtract 2.0 
whatsappRamXtract.sh(our tool) 1.1 
Scalpel 2.0 
 
 
 
8. Testing and Results 
  
In this section we apply our approach towards actual tests to show samples of output we 
retrieved during volatile memory acquisition and analysis. 
 
First the phone has to be rooted. Universal Androot [14] is a good rooting kit and it doesn’t 
disrupt most of the user processes. Also it does not require a reboot of the device so one can be 
  
sure the memory is not wiped off.
it works well with Motorola phones.
 
The phone should then be connected via USB, ensuring that USB debugging is turned on. A 
compiled memfetch is copied into the phone using the adb br
card. The pid for com.whatsapp, 
Execution of memfetch will return the mfetch.lst, and some *.mem and *.map files.
 
The file mem-002.bin is then copied using the adb bridge from the phone and 
whatsappRamXtract is run on it. Our tool takes three options to carve out 
database data (SQL statements) from the file.
  
Following are our sample outputs
file mem-002.bin. 
 
$./whatsapp
 
 
Note : The numbers have been purposely grayed out to ensure privacy of the owner.
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 Universal Androot includes the su binary (superuser.apk), and 
 
idge and data is saved in the SD 
returned from ps is provided to memfetch as an argument. 
numbers, messages
 
 on executing the tool, whatsappRamXtract against our binary 
RamXtract -num mem-002.bin 
Sample Result – 1 
 
 or 
 
  
 
 
$./whatsappRamXtract 
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-mess mem-002.bin 
Sample Result – 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
$./whatsappRamXtract 
 
 
 
9. Research Findings 
 
Our research on volatile memory
and can it can be extracted for further analysis.
shown that all similar applications that load data from a SQLite database can be tested for
recovery using non-volatile memory forensics. To get easy access to data in the database, the 
device memory also caches it in the volatile memory.
 
We saw that data is stored in various forms by the developer and each location can become a 
treasure for an investigator. Rooting the device
knowledge of the directory structure of files and the 
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-sql mem-002.bin 
Sample Result – 3 
 has proved that critical application data is present in the RAM 
 Our non-volatile external storage analysis has 
 Please refer Figure 6. for more det
 did not affect our results, in fact it gave us deeper 
data stored in them. 
 data 
ails. 
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Figure 6. Artifacts Found 
 
Non-Volatile Memory 
(SD Card) + No 
Rooting device 
Non-Volatile Memory 
(SD Card) + Rooting 
device 
Volatile Memory 
(RAM) + Rooting 
device  
msgstore.db Found Encrypted Found Decrypted Contents Found 
wa.db Not Found Found Contents Found 
Phone Numbers Found if db decrypted* Found Found 
Messages Found if db decrypted* Found Found 
Media Files Found if db decrypted* Found Found 
Contact Cards Found if db decrypted* Found Found 
Location  Found if db decrypted* Found Found 
SQL queries Found if db decrypted* Found Found 
Profile Pictures Not Found Found Found 
Logs Not Found Found Contents Found 
Directory Structure Not Found Found Found 
Deleted Messages Not Found Not Found Found 
Deleted Media Files Not Found Not Found Found 
Android Api’s Not Found Not Found Found 
 
* indicates data that can be retrieved from ‘msgstore.db’ on decrypting it using the “WhatsApp 
Database Encryption Project Report." [5] 
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We were able to tap the internal storage folders, external SD card storage and RAM for 
constructive evidence from the WhatsApp application. Due to the process priority feature of the 
Android platform, application data can be retrieved from the heap. Both deleted and undeleted 
messages were retrieved. One thing we realized was that most of the application data gets stored 
on the SD card because internal storage is very small to accommodate the growing usage of 
social networking applications like WhatsApp. This seems to be a trend in particularly Android 
devices. 
 
Here are some points to be noted that we learned during our research. It is a good idea to clear 
data from market app and android.services.framework services from the 'Manage Applications' 
settings before one downloads an application to the phone. This will ensure the cache is cleared 
and the market app will start successfully for application downloads. 
 
We performed all our research inside a virtual machine which gave us an advantage to download 
or run executable files without having to worry about any executable affecting the host machine. 
Other than that all our forensic data was not leaked to the outside world and a separate 
environment was provided to hold all our files in one place. 
 
USB debugging is handled differently when a virtual machine has to detect the USB attached to 
your system. In order to use Android Debug Bridge we had to connect our device to our machine 
and it needed to show up on our Virtual machine. Initially we faced the challenge that our USB 
connection was not getting detected. 
 
In our case we used VirtualBox as the Virtual Machine and followed the guidelines mentioned in 
the VirtualBox manual [16] to 'Add USB Filter' for our Motorola phone. In addition to that we 
also made sure that a filter was added for every USB port of our machine by connecting the 
device from each port and adding it. If one happens to use a different port next time, it will not 
show up in the virtual machine because explicitly a filter is not added for it. After a filter was 
added, we logged into the Virtual Machine and made sure that 'adb devices' shows our Motorola 
phone listed. 
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We also resized our VirtualBox image to 40 GB to be able to accommodate all our research. By 
default only a small partition of the disk is given to the virtual machine which did not seem 
sufficient for all our research. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
WhatsApp has become a popular application for social networking on which people may be 
exchanging their personal and business related information. Our research has shown that one can 
gain complete access to all that information in WhatsApp and in similar social networking 
applications, such as ‘ Viber’. Most chat applications follow a similar pattern of storing messages 
in a database and updating the database periodically. 
 
The approach we took gave a general outline for all similar applications that run on Android 
devices. We were able to successfully complete the aim of our research. One should be aware 
that a password-locked phone is not a black box and one can extract valuable application user 
information from the database and volatile memory. 
 
Our research can be useful for Live Forensic Analysis on Android smart-phones. Databases are 
updated only once every day thus the content acquired may not be current at the time of an 
investigation, whereas live acquisition and analysis of the volatile memory will give us current 
information. When doing a forensic investigation, having the most recent messages for analysis 
can play a vital role. In addition to the recent messages one can look into deleted messages as 
well. 
 
In the future more work can be done on interpretation of RAM data in a human readable form. 
Our tool can be customized to display user specific information based on one’s requirement. As 
of now the tool highlights three important aspects of user data namely phone numbers of users, 
messages they exchanged and database queries giving the basic database structure for WhatsApp. 
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